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SLOGAN OR SUBSTANCE? UNDERSTANDING "OUR
FEDERALISM" AND YOUNGER ABSTENTION
Younger v. Harris I abstention is one of the Burger Court's most
significant legacies. First articulated in 1971, Younger called for a
federal court to refrain from adjudicating requests for injunctive re-
lief arising from an ongoing state criminal prosecution. -Over the
past sixteen years Younger's scope has grown explosively and now
encompasses all state judicial proceedings- criminal or civil-that
implicate an important state interest. Recently, in Ohio Civil Rights
Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court has
taken the Younger doctrine one step further, and ruled that Younger
also applies to some state administrative proceedings. 3
The Younger doctrine arose from concerns of comity, equity,
and federalism. Yet Younger's vigorous growth shows that the driv-
ing force behind the doctrine is federalism, or more specifically, the
vision of federalism that the Younger Court called "Our Federal-
ism." 4 Although visions of federalism differ, a majority of the Court
has held fast to Our Federalism's view that "the National Govern-
ment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that
will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." 5
Thus, Younger abstention simply stands as the application of Our
Federalism-theory in practice.
This Note examines the development of the Younger doctrine in
light of Our Federalism, with a more sympathetic eye towards Our
Federalism than is usually found in the vast commentary on Younger
and its progeny.6 Section I briefly presents the tension among the
federal courts' general obligation to exercise its jurisdiction, the
1 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Court decided five companion cases the same day, mak-
ing up the "Younger sextet:" Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry,
401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200
(1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
2 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986).
3 The rule the Court announced in Dayton appears to call for abstention when the
state administrative proceeding involved is "judicial in nature." See infra notes 123-26
and accompanying text.
4 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
5 Id.
6 Younger has generated considerable heat in the legal community; fortunately, it
has generated considerable light as well. For a frequently updated list of useful discus-
sions of the Younger doctrine, see 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 4252, at 193 n.1 (1988). Much of the commentary on Younger has
been critical, in part suggesting a weakness in Our Federalism as an underlying ration-
ale. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52A, at 330 (4th ed. 1983)
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prudential and constitutional concerns that counsel abstention, and
some of the statutory and common law means by which a federal
court obtains the power to enjoin state proceedings. Section II dis-
cusses the Younger decision itself, contrasting Younger with the vision
of federalism Justice Brennan put forth earlier in Dombrowski v. Pfis-
ter.7 Section III then reviews the development of the Younger doc-
trine, finding in the Court's decisions a consistent and coherent,
although at times timid, amplification of Our Federalism. Section
IV applies the understanding of Our Federalism gleaned in Sections
II and III and suggests two areas where the Younger doctrine might
develop still further: first, that Younger should apply to claims for
money damages as well as to claims for injunctive relief, and second,
that the proper inquiry for a federal court considering Younger ab-
stention in the context of a state administrative proceeding should
depend not on whether that proceeding is judicial in nature, but
whether the state proceeding can provide an adequate remedy for
the federal claimant.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Jurisdiction and Abstention: An Overview
"Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the ex-
ception, not the rule." Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall suggested
that for a federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction was as un-
constitutional as to usurp jurisdiction. 9 Nevertheless, over the past
half-century the Court has ruled that even though a plaintiff is prop-
erly before the court, in certain situations a federal court should re-
frain from exercising its jurisdiction.
The situations calling for abstention fall into three general cate-
gories, 10 although these categories are not exhaustive:'" (1) Pullman
("the difficulty in turning a slogan into workable and understandable legal rules"); Fiss,
Dombrowski, 86 YALE 1103, 1118 (1977) ("merely... a new shibboleth").
7 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
8 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813
(1976).
9 ChiefJustice Marshall said in dictum:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but
it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. . . . With
whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we
must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the
constitution.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
10 Some uncertainty exists as to whether there are several abstention doctrines, or
one doctrine with several distinct applications. Compare County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959) ("the doctrine of abstention") with Colorado
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abstention to permit state court resolution of state law issues that
might make it unnecessary for the federal court to determine consti-
tutional issues; 12 (2) Burford abstention to avoid disrupting a com-
plex and coherent state administrative scheme to regulate a local
matter of substantial public concern;13 and (3) Younger abstention to
avoid unduly interfering with the legitimate activities of the state.14
Pullman abstention permits the court to "avoid both unneces-
sary adjudication of federal questions and 'needless friction with
state policies .... "15 In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., Pullman
had challenged an order of the Texas Railroad Commission as both
unauthorized by Texas law, and in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. A unanimous Supreme Court ordered the district
court to abstain from deciding the case until the parties had re-
ceived a definitive interpretation of the Texas law from a state court.
Thus, federal courts should abstain " 'in cases presenting a federal
constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a differ-
ent posture by a state court determination of pertinent state
law.' "16 In this way the state court could interpret state law with
finality, and the federal court might avoid deciding a constitutional
question.
A federal court should not exercise Pullman abstention when
the meaning of the state law is certain from either unambiguous
statutory language or a prior definitive construction by the state
courts. Because of the prudent desire to avoid premature and un-
necessary decisions of constitutional questions, Pullman requires ab-
stention whenever the "state statute is susceptible of a construction
River, 424 U.S. at 814 ("three general categories") with Ohio Bureau of Employment
Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477 (1977) ("two primary types of federal abstention")
with Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Analyzing the
abstention doctrine is reminiscent of a voyage on uncharted seas. Indeed, it can be
concluded that there is not one abstention doctrine, but several."). Yet, "[t]he number
of categories into which the abstention cases are divided is of little significance." 17 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, § 4241, at 28.
11 In Colorado River, although the Court found that the facts did not fall within any
of the three defined categories of abstention, it ordered abstention due to considera-
tions of" '[w]ise judicial administration.'" 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co.
v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)). Thus, the Court has called for
abstention outside of Pullman, Burford, and Younger. See also, 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
E. COOPER, supra note 6, at §§ 4241-55 (classifying, in addition to Pullman, Burford, and
Younger, abstention to allow states to resolve unsettled questions of state law and absten-
tion to avoid duplicative litigation).
12 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
13 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
14 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
15 Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984) (quoting Pullman, 312
U.S. at 500).
16 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959)).
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by the state judiciary" that might obviate the constitutional issue.17
If a court abstains under Pullman, it retains jurisdiction while
the parties secure a determination of the state law question.' 8 Thus,
Pullman "does not.., involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction,
but only the postponement of its exercise."' 19 Moreover, because
the court retains jurisdiction, it can give interim relief to protect the
parties while they seek the state determination.20 Pullman absten-
tion, therefore, is a matter of timing: when will the federal court
hear a case, not will it hear the case at all.
Burford abstention is less precise than Pullman abstention. In
Burford, Sun Oil challenged an order of the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion granting Burford an exemption from a well-spacing rule.21
The district court enjoined the exemption, but the Supreme Court
ruled that the district court should have abstained. The Court first
noted that Texas's "over-all plan of regulation, as well as each of its
case by case manifestations, is of vital interest to the general pub-
lic."' 22 The Court also ruled that Texas had established a central
and unified system for judicial review of the commission's actions.
The Supreme Court found abstention proper arguing that piece-
meal challenges in federal courts to individual orders would effec-
tively undermine the state's important regulatory system.23
Burford calls for abstention when exercise of federal jurisdiction
will "be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with
respect to a matter of substantial public concern." 24 Unlike Pullman,
Burford requires the district court to dismiss the action outright,
17 Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976); see also Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 236 ("fed-
eral courts need not abstain on Pullman grounds when a state statute is not 'fairly subject
to an interpretation which will render unnecessary' adjudication of the federal constitu-
tional question" (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 535 (1965))).
18 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101-02 n.17 (1980). Because Texas courts can-
not give certain relief while a federal court retains jurisdiction over a federal claim, Pull-
man abstention in Texas results in dismissal without prejudice. Harris County Comm'rs
Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88 n.14 (1975).
19 Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959).
20 Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 312 n.18 (1979).
21 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 316-17 (1943). This essentially permitted
Burford to take a larger amount of oil from the East Texas Oil Field.
22 Id. at 324.
23 Id. at 327.
24 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814
(1976) (Brennan, J.).
The Court has never articulated a concise definition of Burford abstention. In a case
prior to Colorado River, Justice Brennan cited Burford as an example of "abstention on
grounds of comity with the States when the exercise ofjurisdiction by the federal court
would dispute a state administrative process." County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959). Later, Justice Brennan classified Burford as an illustration
of a broader type of abstention that is "appropriate where there have been presented
difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import
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leaving the would-be federal plaintiff to follow "the state procedure
.. from the Commission to the State Supreme Court." 25 She may
then appeal to the United States Supreme Court for review of the
federal question.
Although Burford and Pullman remain relatively narrow, having
never moved far from their original definitions, Younger abstention
has emerged as one of the most formidable, and most maligned,
doctrines today.26 Abstention may still be the exception generally,
but for cases considered under Younger, it has become the rule: "the
normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending
proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions." 27
B. Younger Abstention in Context: The Anti-Injunction Act
and Section 1983
In its simplest terms, the holding of Younger merely prohibits a
federal court from issuing an injunction to stay state criminal pro-
ceedings. This holding may seem unremarkable because, since
1793; a statute of one form or another has prohibited federal courts
from enjoining state court proceedings. The Second Congress
passed what is now known as the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 which pro-
vided in part: "nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay pro-
ceedings in any court of a state." 29 The Act's present-day successor,
28 U.S.C. section 2283, contemplates express statutory exceptions,
but otherwise remains essentially the same.30 The Younger doctrine
comes into play when a federal plaintiff brings an action under one
whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar." Colorado River, 424 U.S.
at 814.
For a general discussion of Burford abstention, see 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 6, at §§ 4244-45.
Because the Younger doctrine now reaches state administrative proceedings in gen-
eral, the independent significance of Burford abstention is unclear. See infra note 153 and
accompanying text.
25 Burford, 319 U.S. at 334.
26 "There is no more controversial, or more quickly changing, doctrine in the fed-
eral courts today than the doctrine of 'Our Federalism,'...." 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, supra note 6, § 4251, at 180. Other authors have commented less gener-
ously. See, e.g., Theis, Younger v. Harris: Federalism in Context, 33 HASTINGs LJ. 103, 105
(1981) ("The general allusions to 'Our Federalism' are a poor substitute for a reasoned
and explicit consideration .... ).
27 Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718,
2723 (1986) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added by Dayton Court)).
28 Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1982)).
29 Id. The Anti-Injunction Act, which the Court views as an important expression
of congressional will, was only one of many provisions in the statute.
30 "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in
a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1982).
[Vol. 73:852856
1988] UNDERSTANDING "OUR FEDERALISM" 857
of these express exceptions.3' After Dayton, however, the Younger
doctrine applies even when section 2283 technically does not apply
at all, such as in the context of administrative proceedings.
C. Section 1983 and Younger Abstention:
An Empirical Excursus
Although Younger abstention is certainly important on a doctri-
nal level, its practical significance requires an examination of
whether Younger leads federal courts to abstain from a large number
of cases. Fortunately, some data is available to begin assessing
Younger's practical effect. Building on an earlier study of section
1983 actions conducted by Professor Eisenberg,32 Professors Eisen-
berg and Schwab have conducted an empirical study of constitu-
tional tort actions 33-actions brought under section 1983 and its
federal counterpart Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics.34 Using the data from these studies, it is possible to
gauge the role Younger is playing in civil rights litigation.
The Eisenberg and Schwab data include actions under section
1983 or Bivens commenced in 1975 and 1976 in the Central District
31 Federal habeas corpus represents an important statutory exceptions to section
2283 because "[a] justice or judge of the United States before whom a habeas corpus
proceeding is pending, may... stay any proceeding against the person detained in any
State court." Id. § 2251.
The constitutional tort action available under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, however, is
the most important exception to section 2283. Section 1983 reads in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), ruled that section
1983 was an express exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Both acts permit federal
courts to enjoin state judicial proceedings.
Federal courts can also enjoin unconstitutional state executive action under the
doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which holds that the eleventh amend-
ment does not bar federal courts from enjoining state officials' unconstitutional acts.
The doctrine of Exparte Young and the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act permit
a federal court to reach into almost any comer of a state's operations. Although Exparte
Young only permits a court to enjoin future actions, i.e., to act prospectively, the elev-
enth amendment bars a federal court from ordering retroactive payments from the state
fisc. Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
32 Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 482 (1982).
33 Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 641 (1987); Schwab & Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influ-
ence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719
(1988).
34 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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of California, and actions commenced from October 1, 1980 to Sep-
tember 30, 1981 (1980 Fiscal Year) in the Central District of Califor-
nia, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the Northern District
of Georgia.35 The data do not distinguish whether the defendants
pleaded abstention under Younger, Pullman, or Burford. Thus, treat-
ing all abstention requests as if they were Younger may overstate
Younger's impact. For the limited purpose of this discussion, how-
ever, this distortion is not significant.
Table I shows the number of times the defendants pleaded ab-
stention. In absolute terms, the data suggest that requests for ab-
stention occur in only a small number of cases. 36 The incidence of
an abstention defense hovers below-usually well below-ten per-
cent.
TABLE I
PLEADING OF ABSTENTION DEFENSE-ALL CASES
Central Eastern Northern Central Central
District of District of District of District of District of
California Pensylvania Georgia California California
(1980FY) (1980FY) (1980FY) (1975) (1976)
Abstention Pleaded 18 (7%) 40 (9%) 1 (.2%) 7 (3%) 11 (5%)
Abstention Not
Pleaded 251 (93%) 384 (91%) 416 (99%+) 226 (89%)193 (88%)
No Data on Immunities
& Defenses 22 (9%) 15 (7%)
Total 269 (100%)424 (100%)417 (100%) 255 (100%)219 (100%)
When claims brought by prisoners are excluded from the data,
the relative incidence of defendants asserting an abstention defense
increases somewhat.37 As Table II shows, absent prisoner claims,
the incidence of abstention defense pleading rises to as much as
13% of the cases (Eastern District of Pennsylvania). Nevertheless,
the results do not suggest that defendants view abstention as a de-
fense that they should plead as a matter of course.
35 For a description of the methodology of these studies, see sources cited supra
notes 32-33.
36 The author thanks Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab for pro-
viding the data on the incidence of abstention pleading as a defense and the disposition
of constitutional tort actions. The views expressed remain this author's alone. See also
Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 539-44 (discussing abstention in light of results of 1975-76
study).
37 The popular perception is that prisoner claims are often frivolous. See, e.g., Pee
Wee's Big Adventure (Warner Bros. 1985) ("Prison's not all that bad. You work out, write
appeals .... "). Thus, nonprisoner cases may represent the most important category of
cases. However, the Eisenberg and Schwab data "suggest that if a lawyer is willing to
take a case, prisoner claims are as successful as nonprisoner claims." Eisenberg &
Schwab, supra note 33, at 692.
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TABLE II
PLEADING OF ABSTENTION DEFENSE-NONPRISONER
CASES ONLY
Central Eastern Northern Central Central
District of District of District of District of District of
California Pensylvania Georgia California California
(1980FY) (1980FY) (1980FY) (1975) (1976)
Abstention Pleaded 18 (9%) 23 (13%) 1 (1%) 7 (6%) 11 (8%6)
Abstention
Not Pleaded 180 (91%) 156 (87%) 123 (99%) 95 (77%) 110 (81%.)
No Data on Immunities
& Defenses 22 (18%.) 15 (11%)
Total 198 (100%) 179 (100%) 124 (100%) 124 (100%) 136 (100%)
Thus, a preliminary view suggests that Younger and the other
abstention doctrines are not foreclosing federal courts from hearing
significant numbers of section 1983 or Bivens actions. Furthermore,
the abstention defense rarely succeeds. Table III presents the dis-
position of all cases, and Table IV for all nonprisoner cases. The
results show that courts abstain in only a handful of cases. In non-
prisoner cases the court abstained in 4, 5, and 6 cases in the Central
District of California during the fiscal year 1980 and the calendar
years 1975 and 1976 respectively. During the period studied, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Geor-
gia abstained in no case.
Even without drawing a statistical inference from the results,38
and allowing for a considerable margin of error and the fact that the
data does not distinguish among the types of abstention, it appears
that Younger is not a threat to the federal courts' role in hearing civil
rights claims.3 9 Two important caveats are in order. First, although
the results suggest that the number of cases where abstention comes
into play is not significant, this observation is quantitative and not
qualitative. The cases themselves may be significant. The second
important caveat is that Younger and its progeny may have an ex ante
effect and discourage some plaintiffs from bringing their claims in
the federal court in the first place. Yet even given these two caveats,
38 Cf. L. E. VON MIEs, HUMAN ACTION 247 (1949) ("Statistical figures referring to
economic events are historical data. They tell us what happened in a nonrepeatable
historical case."); S. SPENDER, Thoughts During an Air Raid, in SELECTED POEMS 40 (1964)
("Of course, the entire effort is to put oneself/ Outside the ordinary range/ Of what are
called statistics.").
39 It is also important to note that in absolute terms the number of section 1983
and Bivens claims is not enormous nor are those claims overburdening the courts, as
Eisenberg and Schwab have shown. See generally sources cited supra notes 32-33. Thus,
Younger should play no role as a crude means of federal docket control.
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TABLE III
CASE DISPOSITION
Central Eastern Northern Central Central
District of District of District of District of District of
California Pensylvania Georgia California California
(1980FY) (1980FY) (1980FY) (1975) (1976)
Disposition
Abstention
Settlement
Stipulated Dismissal
Settlement or Stipulated
Dismissal During Trial
Dismissal By Plaintiff
Dismissal for Lack
of Prosecution
Other Dismissal
Defendant Wins
Summary Judgment
Plaintiff Wins
Summary Judgment
Defendant Wins
after Bench Trial
Plaintiff Wins
after Bench Trial
Defendant Wins
after Jury Trial
Plaintiff Wins
after Jury Trial
Default Judgment
for Plaintiff
Dismissed
During Trial
Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies
in Habeas Cases
(1%)
(11%) 53
(17%) 72
6
(12%) 33 (8%) 25
(16%) 25 (6%) 20
(2%) 7
(10%) 21
(8%) 17
3 (1%) 7 (2%) 1 (0%) 1 (0%)
17 (6%) 16 (4%) 35 (8%) 18 (7%) 12
36 (13%) 25 (6%) 56
86 (31%) 178 (40%) 190
23 (8%) 52 (12%) 34
(13%) 21
(45%) 141
(3%)
(10%)
(8%)
(5%)
(8%) 28 (13%)
(55%) 112 (51%)
(8%) 12 (5%) 9 (4%)
2 (0%) 1 (0%) 1 (0%)
11 (4%) 10 (2%) 14 (3%) 1 (0%) 6 (3%)
7 (3%) 5 (1%) 7 (2%) 4 (2%) 4 (2%)
11 (4%) 12 (3%) 10 (2%) 5 (2%) 1 (0%)
2 (1%) 3 (1%) 3 (1%) 2 (1%)
1 (0%)
1 (0%) 1 (0%) 3 (1%)
4 (1%) 7 (2%)
Total 276 (100%) 441 (100%) 419 (100%) 255 (100%) 219 (100%)
it does not appear that, at least through 1981, Younger had sub silentio
undercut section 1983 significantly.
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Central Eastern Northern
District of District of District of
California Pensylvania Georgia
(1980FY) (1980FY) (1980FY)
Central
District of
California
(1975)
Disposition
Abstention 4
Settlement 25
Stipulated Dismissal 44
Settlement or Stipulated
Dismissal During Trial 3
Dismissal By Plaintiff 13
Dismissal for Lack
of Prosecution 24
Other Dismissal 48
Defendant Wins
Summary Judgment 13
Plaintiff Wins
Summary Judgment
Defendant Wins
after Bench Trial 10
Plaintiff Wins
after Bench Trial 6
Defendant Wins
after Jury Trial 10
Plaintiff Wins
after Jury Trial 2
Default Judgment
for Plaintiff
Dismissed During Trial
Total 202
(2%)
(12%) 40 (22%) 18 (15%)
(22%) 45 (24%) 17 (14%)
(4%)
(20%)
(16%)
(1%) 6 (3%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%)
(6%) 8 (4%) 9 (7%) 14 (11%)
(5%)
(15%)
(13%)
11 (8%)
(12%) 6 (3%) 7 (6%) 12 (10%) 15 (11%)
(24%) 42 (23%) 31 (25%) 30 (24%) 48 (35%)
(6%) 20 (11%) 14 (11%)
2 (1%) 1 (1%)
(5%) 3 (2%) 9 (7%)
(3%) 2 (1%) 6 (5%)
(5%) 8 (4%) 6 (5%)
(1%) 1 (1%) 3 (2%)
9 (7%) 5 (4%)
1 (1%)
1 (1%) 6 (4%)
1 (1%) 4 (3%)
5 (4%) 1 (1%)
2 (1%)
1 (1%)
2 (2%)
(100%) 184 (100%) 124 (100%) 124 (100%) 136 (100%o)
II
THE BIRTH OF THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE
A. The View of Federalism Prior to Younger:
Dombrowski v. Pftster
When the Court addressed Younger the slate was not clean. In-
deed, Dombrowski v. Pfister40 was writ large, and under its banner civil
rights lawyers marched into federal courts for injunctive and declar-
atory relief against allegedly unconstitutional state actions. 41
40 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
41 This analysis relies shamelessly on Fiss's peerless treatment of Dombrowski v. Pfis-
ter, its role in civil rights litigation, and the vision of federalism that Younger so radically
altered. See Fiss, supra note 6.
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TABLE IV
CASE DIsPosrrIoN-NONPRISONER CASES
Central
District of
California
(1976)
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Younger responded to Dombrowski and the vision of federalism that
Justice Brennan quietly presented in it.
In Dombrowski, Louisiana had charged civil rights activists under
the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law
and the Communist Propaganda Control Law.42 The plaintiffs
brought an action in federal court under section 1983 seeking de-
claratory and injunctive relief after the state threatened criminal
prosecution. 43 The plaintiffs challenged the applicable Louisiana
statute as unconstitutionally overboard and in violation of the first
and fourteenth amendments. The plaintiffs also alleged that the
state used threats of prosecution simply to harass civil rights
activists. 44
The district court abstained, allowing the state criminal process
to take its course.45 The court feared that enjoining the state pro-
ceedings would hinder "the state and local courts of this nation in
the exercise of their sovereign rights of self-protection." 46
The Supreme Court47 reversed, ordering the district court to
enjoin the state criminal proceedings. In an opinion by Justice
Brennan, the Court carefully charted a course which led to the de-
sired destination: ready access to federal injunctive and declaratory
relief for civil rights claimants.4 8
42 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:358-:374; 14:390-:390.8 (Cum. Supp. 1962). Most of
the plaintiffs were officers of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., an organ-
ization "active in fostering civil rights for Negroes in Louisiana and other States of the
South." Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 482.
43 Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 481-82.
44 Id. at 482, 487-89.
45 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 479
(1965).
46 Id. at 560.
47 ChiefJustice Warren, with Justices Douglas, White and Goldberg, joined injus-
tice Brennan's opinion for the Court. Justice Harlan dissented and was joined byJustice
Clark. Justices Black and Stewart took no part. At this time "the liberal bloc on the
Warren Court was its strongest, yet there were few votes to spare." Fiss, supra note 6, at
1105.
48 Justice Brennan disposed of the Anti-Injunction Act problem quickly, relegating
it to a footnote. Because the Act applied explicitly only to state proceedings actually
pending, and at the time the plaintiffs commenced their federal action state criminal
prosecution was only threatened, the Act posed no bar. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 484 n.2.
The problem, however, was not as facile asJustice Brennan suggested. In an earlier
case, Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), the Court refused to enjoin
threatened prosecutions, finding a Congressional policy "of leaving generally to the state
courts the trial of criminal cases arising under state laws, subject to review by this Court
of any federal questions involved." Ida at 163. Rather than reading the Anti-Injunction
Act to include a Congressional policy against federal court intervention, Justice Brennan
construed the statute narrowly, allowing federal courts to act if the federal plaintiff were
quicker to the mark.
The Court overcame Louisiana's call for Pullman abstention by ruling that the state
courts could not simply construe the statute so as to remove its unconstitutional taint.
The statute was so overbroad that it could be 'Justifiably attacked on [its] face as abridg-
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Dombrowski's greatest significance was its abolition of the tradi-
tional limits on equity jurisdiction for federal plaintiffs. A court of
equity will not grant relief if the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
law-the inadequacy prerequisite. 49 Dombrowski held that raising the
constitutional claim as a defense in the state criminal trial was not an
adequate remedy for prosecution under an overbroad statute that
also infringes on important first amendment rights. 50 Justice Bren-
nan reasoned that when a plaintiff challenges a statute as overbroad,
"[t]he assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will gener-
ally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights is
unfounded."5 1
Justice Harlan's vigorous dissent criticized "the Court's major
premise that criminal enforcement of an overly broad statute affect-
ing rights of speech and association is in itself a deterrent to [free
speech]. *52 Harland saw in the court's major premise an "unarticu-
lated assumption that state courts will not be as prone as federal
courts to vindicate constitutional rights promptly and effectively." 53
If the Dombrowski majority believed that the state courts would
fairly decide the federal constitutional claim raised as a defense,
then it would not matter which court, federal or state, heard the
claim. If a plaintiff alleges that the statute under which a state pro-
secutes her is unconstitutional, then the state court could give the
same remedy as a federal court-void the law as repugnant to the
Constitution. The remedies available from the two courts would di-
verge only when the plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the
prosecution itself (e.g., selective and discriminatory). A state court
would acquit, while a federal court would'enjoin the prosecution it-
self.54 Justice Harlan rejected the Dombrowski majority's assumption
that state courts would not decide the constitutional claims fairly,
just as the Younger Court would seven years later.
Having found the inadequacy prerequisite satisfied, the Dom-
browski Court turned to whether the plaintiff satisfied the irreparable
injury prerequisite to injunctive relief. The Court ruled that even if
the state probably could not convict the accused, the prosecution
ing free expression." Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 489-90. Because no open question of
state law existed, Pullman did not require abstention.
49 Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 485-88.
50 Id. There was some precedent to the contrary. See Douglas v. City ofJeannette,
319 U.S. 157 (district court should not exercise equity jurisdiction where Supreme
Court could review state court's decision and plaintiff unable to show imminent irrepa-
rable injury).
51 Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 486.
52 Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
53 Id.
54 See Wingate, The Bad Faith-Harassment Exception to the Younger Doctrine: Exploring
the Empty Universe, 5 REv. LTGATION 123, 141-42 (1986).
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would have such a chilling effect on free speech rights that the dis-
trict court should enjoin the state prosecution.55
After Dombrowski, " '[c]hilling effect' and 'overbreadth' became
the slogans of civil rights litigators. ' 56 Once a plaintiff alleged over-
breadth, the federal court could determine that no adequate remedy
at law existed, and could therefore entertain the request for relief.
An overbreadth claim also permitted the court to enjoin the state
proceedings because, under Dombrowski, the prosecution's chilling
effect justified a finding of irreparable injury. Civil rights activists
threatened with criminal prosecution, therefore, could readily ob-
tain federal equitable relief.57
Yet, as Professor Fiss observed, "Dombrowski was of course not a
struggle about remedies but aboutjudges. ' 5 8 Dombrowski's vision of
federalism stresses choice and duplication in having access to both
federal and state courts to protect individual liberties. Dombrowski
puts great weight on the role of the national government, not to
displace the states, but to overlap them. The Court apparently felt
that too much of a good thing is not bad when the good sought is
judicial protection of individual rights. Yet, under the slogan of
"Our Federalism," the Supreme Court adopted a profoundly differ-
ent vision of federalism only seven years after Dombrowski.
B. Younger v. Harris: "Our Federalism" Triumphant
California was prosecuting Harris, a teacher and advocate of
Marxism, under its Criminal Syndicalism Act.59 Claiming that the
Act violated the first amendment, Harris brought an action in fed-
eral court under section 1983 to have the Act declared unconstitu-
tional and to enjoin his prosecution.60
The district court agreed with Harris, declaring the Act uncon-
stitutional on its face as overbroad and vague 6' and enjoined further
55 Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 486-87.
56 Fiss, supra note 6, at 1116.
57 See Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of
Dombrowski, 48 TEx. L. REv. 535, 580-85 & nn.200-47 (1970).
58 Fiss, supra note 6, at 1116.
59 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400, 11401 (West 1972). The text of the Act is set forth
in Younger, 401 U.S. at 38-39 n.1. The Supreme Court had previously found the Act
constitutional. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). By the time Younger had
reached the Supreme Court, however, the Court had invalidated a similar act in Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
60 The Supreme Court had not yet determined whether section 1983 was an excep-
tion to the Anti-Injunction Act, and thus whether that Act would bar federal interven-
tion. Additional plaintiffs, therefore, joined the case and appropriately recited the
Dombrowski formula of "overbreadth" and "chilling effect." Younger, 401 U.S. at 39-40.
Either way the plaintiffs seemed assured of a federal forum.
61 Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 516 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).
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prosecution of Harris.62 Younger, the District Attorney of Los An-
geles County, appealed.
Younger came to the Supreme Court after changes in the Court's
personnel,63 and perhaps in its mood as well.64 The Court, speak-
ing through Justice Black, rejected plaintiff's mere incantation of
Dombrowski, and denied relief.65 Without deciding if section 1983
was an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court held that
even if the district court could issue an injunction,66 it should not
have done so because of "the absence of the factors necessary under
equitable principles to justify federal intervention. ' 67
Rather than overrule Dombrowski, the Court construed Dombrow-
ski narrowly and focused on the allegations of prosecutorial bad
faith. 68 The Court admitted that "there are some statements in the
Dombrowski opinion that would seem to support [the] argument" 69
that Dombrowski had "substantially broadened the availability of in-
junctions against state criminal prosecutions." 70 However, the
Younger Court repudiated those statements.
The majority rejected Dombrowski's finding that the chilling ef-
fect of a single criminal prosection canjustify federal intervention.7 1
The Younger Court was confident in the adequacy of the remedy
available to Younger-raising his constitutional claims as a defense
in the criminal prosecution. 72 Thus, the Younger Court rejected
Dombrowski's underlying assumption that state courts will not be as
solicitous of constitutional claims as federal courts.7 3 The Court
62 Id. at 517.
63 Of the original Dombrowski majority, only Justices Brennan, Douglas and White
remained. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Dombrowski, remained on the Court, as did Jus-
tices Black and Stewart, who had not participated in Dombrowski. Chief Justice Burger
had come to the Court that year, and Justices Marshall and Blackmun had joined the
Court earlier.
64 Professor Fiss suggests that in the interim period before Younger, the maturing of
the civil rights movement and its increasingly national focus, the Watts riots, and other
traumatic events such as the assassinations of President Kennedy, Senator Kennedy, and
Martin Luther King "affected the Justices' perception of those [civil rights] protest activ-
ities. The Justices were less inclined to intervene on behalf of the movement, less in-
dined to guarantee it a federal forum." Fiss, supra note 6, at 1117.
65 The Court also found that the plaintiffs who faced only potential prosecution
lacked standing. Younger, 401 U.S. at 42.
66 One of Younger's companion cases ruled that Younger's analysis also barred de-
claratory judgment. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
67 Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
68 Id. at 47-49.
69 Id. at 50.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 50-52.
72 Id. at 49 ("Here a proceeding was already pending in the state court, affording
Harris an opportunity to raise his constitutional claims.").
73 The Court recently reaffirmed its confidence in the ability and desire of state
courts to vindicate constitutional rights. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct.
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also rejected Dombrowski's rule that the chilling effect on first
amendment rights produced by a prosecution under an overbroad
statute justified injunctive relief.74
Dombrowski had weakened the inadequacy prerequisite, but after
Younger "the inadequacy prerequisite once again emerged.., as a
vital limitation on injunctions. ' 75 Justice Black shifted the frame-
work of analysis from Dombrowski's traditional notions of equity ju-
risdiction, to one in which equity, comity, and federalism combined
to restrict the availability of federal injunctive or declaratory relief.
Justice Black reasoned that courts of equity should exercise
their jurisdiction with restraint "to prevent erosion of the role of the
jury and avoid a duplication of legal proceedings and legal sanctions
where a single suit would be adequate to protect the rights as-
serted."' 76 This reasoning, however, seems less compelling when a
plaintiff asserts important constitutional rights. Consequently, Jus-
tice Black also discussed the additional, uniquely American, reasons
for constraining federal equity jurisdiction. 77 In a famous pas-
sage, 78 Justice Black argued that comity and federalism considera-
tions combined to call for limiting equity jurisdiction:
[The reasons for restraining courts of equity are reinforced by]
the notion of "comity," that is, a proper respect for state func-
tions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up
of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of
the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate func-
tions in their separate ways. 79
Justice Black called his vision of the proper relationship be-
tween the federal courts and the states "Our Federalism."80 Ex-
tending beyond state criminal proceedings, Our Federalism holds as
1519, 1528 (1987) ("Article VI of the United States Constitution declares that 'the
Judges in every State shall be bound' by the Federal Constitution, laws, and treaties. We
cannot assume that state judges will interpret ambiguities in state procedural law to bar
presentation of federal claims.").
74 Younger, 401 U.S. at 50-52.
75 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONs 79 (2d ed. 1984).
76 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
77 Id. ("fundamental purpose of restraining equity jurisdiction within narrow limits
is equally important under our Constitution").
78 Justice Stevens referred to this passage as "the majestic language in Mr. Justice
Black's Younger opinion." Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 464 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
79 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
80 This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is re-
ferred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the
profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is
bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of
"Our Federalism."
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its chief tenet that federal courts should avoid interfering with the
operation of the states whenever possible. As such, Our Federalism
is the ideological parent of the Younger doctrine, a doctrine that
reaches out from the Younger holding to define the relationship be-
tween the federal courts and the states.
Our Federalism rests in part on the belief that states should be
permitted to act independently, with only the bare minimum of fed-
eraljudicial interference.8 ' In a famous dictum discussing the bene-
fits of such an approach, Justice Brandeis observed that "[i]t is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."8 2 Yet Our Federalism does not simply rest on faith in the
integrity of independent state action. The source of Our Federalism
lies in the structure of the federal system created by the
Constitution.
Justice Black did not suggest that the federal courts could never
enjoin state actions, but he stressed that a federal court should only
do so when truly necessary:
[Our Federalism] does not mean blind deference to "States'
Rights" any more than it means centralization of control over
every important issue in our National Government and its courts.
The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does
represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate
interests of both State and National Governments, and in which
the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate
and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors
to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States.8 3
Justice Black's rhetoric recognizes that federal courts have an im-
portant interest in vindicating constitutional rights. That interest
must be tempered with the need to allow states to act unhampered.
Justice Black, however, did not indicate what would constitute
undue interference. "Unduly" is a balancing word. At first blush,
81 "Since the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few ex-
ceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interfer-
ence by federal courts." Id. at 43.
82 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Brandeis's statement predates Younger by almost fifty years, but the hope it
expresses continues to be voiced today. See, e.g., Friendly, Federalism: A Forward, 86 YALE
LJ. 1019, 1034 (1977) ("There is still truth in Mr.Justice Brandeis' renowned observa-
tion .. . .").
83 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. Justice Black concluded with a lofty peroration: "It
should never be forgotten that this slogan, 'Our Federalism,' born in the early strug-
gling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's
history and its future." Id. at 44-45.
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one might think that Justice Black is suggesting a case-by-case bal-
ancing. Nevertheless, viewed in light of Younger, "unduly interfere"
simply restates the inadequacy prerequisite. Once the Court deter-
mined that Harris had an adequate remedy in the state proceedings,
any federal interference would have been undue. Our Federalism
needs the inadequacy prerequisite to insure that states can conduct
their affairs without unnecessary federal court interference.
Many critics of the Younger doctrine suggest that the Court gave
short shrift to the federal courts' role in vindicating constitutional
rights. Yet, Our Federalism rests on the belief that state courts will
properly vindicate constitutional rights, as the Supremacy Clause
binds them to do. From that premise it follows that the federal
courts must refrain from exercising equity jurisdiction to realize the
benefits of permitting states to act as freely as possible.
The Court recognized that the Younger doctrine is not without
costs. Once the federal court abstains, the would-be federal plaintiff
must suffer the injury " 'incidental to every criminal proceeding' ":
time, cost, and possible embarrassment.8 4 Moreover, if the state
court decides the constitutional issue incorrectly, the individual
must undergo the expense and delay of proceeding through the
state appellate system and ultimately may have to seek direct review
by the Supreme Court.8 5 Our Federalism, as adopted by the Younger
Court, asks the individual to make this sacrifice for the larger bene-
fits the Court believes will flow to society from federal restraint.
Younger produced three enduring legacies. First is the Court's
holding that federal courts should not enjoin ongoing state criminal
proceedings. Second is Our Federalism, that requires federal courts
to refrain from unduly interfering with state activities. Third is the
Younger doctrine that applies the principles of Our Federalism to
other cases. The Court could have limited Younger as it has limited
the other abstention doctrines, but because a majority of the Court
has continued to embrace Our Federalism, the Younger doctrine re-
mains vital, if controversial.
III
THE EVOLUTION OF THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE
As a threshold issue, Younger becomes a factor only when the
defendant in a state action asks a federal court to enjoin or other-
wise disrupt the state proceeding.8 6 When later courts tried to ex-
84 Id. at 49 (quoting Douglas v. City ofJeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943)).
85 The Burford Court required the same sacrifice by the individual. See supra notes
24-25 and accompanying text.
86 The Younger doctrine also calls for abstention when the plaintiff's action seeking
money damages would disrupt a state proceeding as much as an action seeking an in-
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tract rules from Younger about when to abstain, three elements
emerged. First, the state proceedings must be ongoing when the
plaintiff seeks federal injunctive or declaratory relief. Second, the
state forum must be adequate to hear the constitutional claim.
Third, the Younger holding applies only to state criminal proceed-
ings. In the fifteen years since deciding Younger, the Court has ex-
panded each of these elements.
A. The Ongoing State Proceedings Requirement
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.87 the Court reaffirmed the Younger
doctrine's overarching principle of noninterference by holding that
"proceeding" meant exhausting all state appellate remedies. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented, argu-
ing that the majority's decision undercut the Court's earlier rule in
Monroe v. Pape.88 In Monroe the court ruled that a section 1983 plain-
tiff did not have to exhaust state administrative or judicial reme-
dies.8 9 Justice Brennan wrote that Huffman led to the result that
"the mere filing of a complaint against a potential § 1983 litigant
forces him to exhaust state remedies." 90 Yet the majority rejected
this view, saying that their opinion in no way impinged on the
Monroe holding.91
Younger abstention applies only to ongoing state proceedings
because "the relevant principles of equity, comity, and federalism
'have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding.' "92
Consequently, Younger does not prohibit a federal court from en-
junction. This typically occurs when a section 1983 plaintiff brings a suit for damages,
and in order to decide the case, the court essentially must review the constitutionality of
the prosecution of conviction. See McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd
on other grounds, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (abstention to permit state court to review convic-
tion); Fulford v. Klein, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (per curiam) (suit chal-
lenges constitutionality of conviction); Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1976)
(state prosecution pending); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974) (review
of conviction pending in state court).
87 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In Huffman, Ohio brought a civil action under its nuisance
law against a theater owner who was showing obscene films. Id. at 595-97. An Ohio
court granted an injunction against the theater owner. Id. at 598. The theater owner,
rather than appealing the injunction in the Ohio courts, brought a federal action seeking
to enjoin the enforcement of the injunction. Id. The district court declared the Ohio
law unconstitutional on first amendment grounds, and enjoined execution of the injunc-
tion. Id. at 599. As the Court noted, "Virtually all of the evils at which Younger is di-
rected would inhere in federal intervention prior to completion of state appellate
proceedings, just as surely as they would if such intervention occurred at or before
trial." Id. at 608.
88 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
89 Huffman, 420 U.S. at 617 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 609 n.21 (majority opinion).
92 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (quoting Lake Carriers' Ass'n v.
MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972)).
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joining threatened state proceedings. A federal plaintiff, however,
must also present a significant enough threat of prosecution to sat-
isfy standing requirements. 93 Thus, a potential plaintiff must insti-
tute her federal action within a brief "window of opportunity"-
when the threat of prosecution suffices to give standing, but before
the state commences an action that triggers Youngr. Such a race to
the courthouse is unseemly, 94 and given Younger's broad doctrinal
origins in Our Federalism, unnecessarily technical. The Supreme
Court faced this problem in Hicks v. Miranda.95
In Hicks the Court held that mere 'first in time' does not deter-
mine whether Younger abstention is proper.96 Federal courts should
abstain when "state criminal proceedings are begun against the fed-
eral plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any pro-
ceedings of substance have taken place in the federal court."
97
Younger still requires an ongoing state proceeding, but the court de-
termines whether the proceeding is ongoing when it addresses
whether equitable relief is proper, not when the federal action
commenced. 98
93 Article III of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to situations where there
is a "case or controversy." Courts have interpreted this to require that the plaintiff have
standing to sue in the federal court. "[T]he plaintiff [must] 'allege[] such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court
jurisdiction and tojustify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)). The plaintiff must have a "personal stake" in the action. He must "himself
[have] suffered 'some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal
action .... ' Id. at 499 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)).
94 Professor Fiss refers to it as a potential "squeeze play." Fiss, supra note 6, at
1133.
95 422 U.S. 332 (1975). In Hicks a California court ordered the police to seize cop-
ies of the film "Deep Throat" from a theater showing the film. After holding a hearing,
the court found the film obscene and ordered all copies seized. The theater owner and
his employees, two of whom the state had earlier charged with a misdemeanor for show-
ing the film, did not appeal the court's judgment or order.' Instead, the theater owner
brought an action in federal court to enjoin enforcement of the California obscenity law
and declare the law unconstitutional. While the federal court action was pending, the
state amended its criminal complaint against the two theater employees to include all
other employees and the theater owner. Id. at 336-39. Six months later, the district
court declared the obscenity law unconstitutional, rejecting the state's claim that Younger
called for abstention. Id. at 340. Hicks questioned if the Younger doctrine called for ab-
stention even when the plaintiff had commenced the federal action before the state filed
criminal charges.
96 The Hicks Court also argued that the Younger doctrine called for abstention be-
cause theater owner's interests were intertwined with those of the two employees whom
the state was already prosecuting. Id. at 348-49.
97 Id. at 349.
98 For cases in which abstention was not appropriate see, e.g., Adultworld Book-
store v. City of Fresno, 758 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1985) (evidentiary hearing in federal
court); Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.) (hearing on motion
for preliminary injunction), cert. denied sub nom. Theatres West Inc. v. Holmes, 455 U.S.
913 (1981). Abstention was appropriate in, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.
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Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Mar-
shall, dissented in Hicks. Stressing that "the federal courts are 'the
primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by
the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States,' "99jus-
tice Stewart argued that the rule the majority adopted would "oust"
federal courts from their role as protector of federal rights' 00 and
operate as "an open invitation for state officials to institute state
proceedings in order to defeat federal jurisdiction."''0
Nevertheless, the majority thought that to adopt Justice
Stewart's first-in-time rule would "trivialize the principles of Younger
v. Harris."'0 2 The flexible rule given in Hicks recognized that
Younger abstention rests on the broad principles of Our Federalism,
not technical rules. 10 3
B. The Nature of the Proceeding: The Important State
Interest Requirement
Although Younger arose in the context of state criminal proceed-
ings, Our Federalism speaks to a wider spectrum of cases. The
Court has acknowledged the principle's breadth by invoking absten-
tion in a growing variety of circumstances. Our Federalism does not
ask what type of proceeding is involved, but rather whether the fed-
eral court exercising equity jurisdiction will "unduly interfere with
the legitimate activities of the states."' 10 4
1. Expansion to State Civil Proceedings
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. '05 the Court first expanded Younger to
a civil proceeding "akin to a criminal prosecution."106 The Huffman
Court noted that the element of Younger that rested "upon the tradi-
tional reluctance of courts of equity ... to interfere with a criminal
prosecution... is not available to mandate federal restraint in civil
cases."107 However, "relevant considerations of federalism [call for
Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (abstention issue only issue litigated); Ora-
zio v. Town of North Hempstead, 426 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Nevin v. Ferdon,
413 F. Supp. 1043, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (proceedings "confined to arguments on the
Court's jurisdiction and on the issue of abstention").
99 Hicks, 422 U.S. at 355 (Stewart, J. dissenting) (quoting F. FRANKFURTER & J.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYS-
TEM 65 (1927)).
100 Id. at 356.
101 Id. at 357.
102 Id. at 350 (majority opinion).
103 See Fiss, supra note 6, at 1135 ("From the perspective of Younger, 'Our Federal-
ism,' and the interests they seek to further, the rule of Hicks v. Miranda makes sense.").
104 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
105 420 U.S. 592 (1975). For a discussion of the facts of Huffman, see supra note 87.
106 Id. at 604.
107 Id.
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federal restraint] .. since interference with a state judicial proceed-
ing prevents the state not only from effectuating its substantive poli-
cies, but also from continuing to perform the separate function of
providing a forum competent to vindicate any constitutional objec-
tions interposed against those policies."' 08 The Huffman Court fur-
ther reasoned that the civil nuisance proceeding "[was] in aid of and
closely related to criminal statutes," and that federal interference in
the nuisance proceeding would be "an offense to the State's interest
•.. every bit as great" as if it were a criminal proceeding. 10 9
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, vig-
orously dissented, rejecting the majority's view that Our Federalism
applied outside criminal proceedings. Justice Brennan argued that
Younger culminated a distinct line of cases holding that "equitable
interference by federal courts with pending state prosecutions is in-
compatible in our federal system with the paramount role of the
states in the definition of crimes and the enforcement of criminal
laws." 110 The tradition concerning federal interference, however,
did not apply to state civil proceedings. Justice Brennan argued that
a consistent trend in the past showed increasing judicial and con-
gressional exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act's flat prohibition
against injunctions.'11 Moreover, civil proceedings lacked the pro-
cedural safeguards present in the criminal process that might guard
against "spurious prosecution-arrest, charge, information or in-
dictment." 112 Despite these objections, a majority of six refused to
limit the Younger doctrine to state criminal proceedings.
Two years later, the Supreme Court extended Younger even fur-
ther, ruling inJudice v. Vail 13 that the Younger doctrine also applied
to certain civil actions not intimately bound up with criminal stat-
utes. Vail challenged the constitutionality of the judicial contempt
procedures. The Court called for abstention, stressing that the
state's "interest in the contempt process, through which it vindi-
108 Id. The Court went on to note that federal interference can lead to duplicative
proceedings and "can readily be interpreted 'as reflecting negatively upon the state
court's ability to enforce constitutional principles.'" Id. (citing Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974)).
109 Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604.
110 Id at 614 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"I1 Id. at 614-15.
112 Id at 615.
113 430 U.S. 327 (1977). Vail had defaulted on a credit agreement and after the
state court had entered a default judgment against Vail, the creditor sought discovery.
Vail did not comply and was cited for contempt. The court fined Vail, and when Vail did
not pay, had him arrested. Instead of appealing the contempt order in state court, Vail
brought a class action under section 1983 challenging the constitutionality of the con-
tempt procedures. A three-judge district court found the challenged statute unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 329-31. The Supreme Court reversed, and held that the district court
should have abstained under the Younger doctrine. Id. at 339.
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cates the regular operation of its judicial system . . . is surely an
important interest." 114 The Court concluded that the Younger doc-
trine applied to state civil contempt proceedings because of the pro-
ceedings analogous relationship to criminal proceedings.
Justice Brennan again dissented, joined by Justice Marshall.
Justice Brennan repeated the objections he had made to the expan-
sion of the Younger doctrine in Huffman. Arguing that the "very pur-
pose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the
States and the people,"1 15 Justice Brennan stated that the majority's
opinion "strip[ped] all meaningful content from 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983."116 In his view, "[F]orced federal abdication ... undercuts
one of the chief values of federalism-the protection and vindica-
tion of important and overriding federal civil rights, which Con-
gress, in § 1983 and the Judiciary Act of 1875 [granting federal
question jurisdiction], ordained should be a primary responsibility
of the federal courts.""17
The majority, however, rejected Justice Brennan's view, and ad-
hered to Our Federalism's tenet that state courts can also protect
federal rights. The Court reiterated its position that allowing the
would-be federal plaintiff to raise her constitutional claim as a de-
fense in the state proceeding satisfies the federal interest in vindicat-
ing constitutional rights.
Shortly afterJudice, the Court continued its expansive applica-
tion of the Younger doctrine in Trainor v. Hernandez.'18 The Supreme
Court reasoned that the Younger doctrine required abstention from
interfering with state attachment procedures through which the
state tried to recover fraudulently obtained welfare payments. The
Court found that "the suit and the accompanying writ of attachment
were brought to vindicate important state policies." 1 9 "Important
state policy" or "interest," and not the nature of the proceeding,
became the test for applying the Younger doctrine. "The policies un-
derlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceed-
ings when important state interests are involved."' 120
Yet the Court has provided virtually no guidance in how to de-
termine the importance of a state interest. The Supreme Court has
114 Id. at 335.
115 Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 343-44.
118 431 U.S. 434 (1977). Illinois had brought a civil action to recover fraudulently
obtained welfare payments. The defendants in the state action, Mr. and Mrs. Her-
nandez, brought a federal action challenging the constitutionality of the Illinois attach-
ment procedures that the state invoked in the suit.
119 Id. at 444.
120 Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982).
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never held a state interest to be "unimportant," and only a precious
few lower court precedents so hold.121 Our Federalism suggests
that federal courts may offend the states as much by deciding when a
state interest is important as by interfering with a proceeding in the
first place.
2. Expansion to State Administrative Proceedings
Although the contours of Younger abstention have never been
crystal clear,122 applying Younger to administrative proceedings adds
further complications. Yet here, as in the rest of Younger jurispru-
dence, the Court has broadly applied Younger principles, which may
force individuals to wind their way through a state's administrative
and judicial systems.
In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. 123
the Supreme Court held that the Younger doctrine calls for absten-
tion from ongoing administrative proceedings. 124 Dayton involved a
teacher at a religious school who claimed that the school discrimi-
nated against her when it fired her because she wanted to continue
working even though she was pregnant. The school claimed that
because of its religious creed that mothers stay at home with their
young children, it had a right to dismiss the teacher.' 25
The teacher brought an action before the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission, alleging violation of state law against sex discrimina-
tion. The Commission instituted administrative proceedings
against the School and the School in turn commenced an action in
federal district court seeking an injunction against the state adminis-
trative proceedings on the grounds that "any investigation of [its]
hiring process or any imposition of sanctions for Dayton's [action
toward the teacher] would violate the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment."' 126 The Commission responded on the merits, and,
inter alia, called for abstention.1 27
The district court denied the injunction on the merits, and did
121 See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1150 (2d Cir. 1986) (state inter-
est in bond provision "relatively minor"), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987); Mobil Oil Corp.
v. City of Long Beach, 772 F.2d 534, 542 (9th Cir. 1985) (state suing in proprietary, not
sovereign capacity, and seeking only money damages).
122 "[Als our cases abundantly illustrate, this area of law is in constant litigation, and
it is an area through which our decisions have traced a path that may accurately be de-
scribed as sinuous." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 479 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
123 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986).
124 Id. at 2723-24.
125 Id. at 2721.
126 Id. at 2722.
127 Id.
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not even address the abstention claim.' 28 The court of appeals re-
versed, holding that the Commission's proceedings violated both
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the first
amendment. 29
The Supreme Court ruled that the district court should have
abstained. Rather than relying on rules of equity to order absten-
tion, the Court found that its past "concern for comity and federal-
ism is equally applicable to [other nonjudicial] pending state
proceedings."'' 3 0
The Dayton Court inferred from two previous decisions that the
principles of Our Federalism required a federal court to abstain
from enjoining state administrative proceedings. Gibson v. Berry-
hill,' -3 the first of these decisions cited by the Court, did not decide
whether the Younger doctrine applied to administrative proceedings.
The Gibson Court ruled that abstention was improper because the
administrative board's bias made it incompetent to consider the fed-
eral issues.13 2
The Dayton Court also cited Middlesex County Ethics Committee v.
Garden State Bar Association,133 in which the Supreme Court had or-
dered the district court to abstain from interfering with state bar
disciplinary proceedings. As in Gibson, the Middlesex Court did not
decide if Younger applied to administrative proceedings qua adminis-
trative proceedings. Instead, the Middlesex Court stressed that the
Younger doctrine applied because New Jersey law considers the pro-
ceedings judicial and not administrative: "It is clear beyond doubt
that the New Jersey Supreme Court considers its bar disciplinary
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 2723.
131 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
The state board argued in Gibson that the Court, in Geiger v. Jenkins, 401 U.S. 985
(1971), had previously found Younger applicable by summarily affirming a lower court's
abstention from intervening in a Georgia State Medical Board license revocation pro-
ceeding. Gibson, 411 U.S. at 576. The Gibson Court rejected this, distinguishing Geiger as
(1) involving a pending criminal proceeding, and (2) involving revocation proceedings
that were quasi-criminal under Georgia law. Id.
In Gibson, a state regulatory board composed entirely of private optometrists
charged optometrists employed by a large company with unprofessional conduct. The
board had the power to suspend or revoke the optometrists' licenses. The optometrists
brought suit in federal court under section 1983 seeking to enjoin the administrative
proceedings. Id. at 567-69. Over the board's call for Younger abstention, the district
court granted the injunction. Id at 570. The district court reasoned that the board's
members were biased because they had a financial interest in discouraging these nonpri-
vate optometrists. Id at 571.
The Gibson Court agreed, and affirmed the district court's order.
132 Gibson, 411 U.S. at 578-79.
133 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
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proceedings as 'judicial in nature.' ",134 The Middlesex Court did not
apply Younger to administrative proceedings because it characterized
the administrative proceeding as judicial.
The Dayton Court found that "the principles enunciated in
these cases [Gibson and Middlesex] govern the present one,"1 5 and
held that the Younger doctrine required federal courts to abstain.
Although the Court's analysis differed greatly from Middlesex, the
Dayton Court cited Middlesex for the proposition that federal courts
should abstain only when the proceeding is "judicial in nature."
Middlesex found that the state proceeding "constitute[d] an ongoing
statejudicial proceeding."' 13 6 The Dayton Court, however, made no
such inquiry, ordering abstention after finding that the proceeding
was administrative. Dayton suggests that administrative proceedings
trigger abstention because the principles of Our Federalism apply
not only to judicial proceedings, but also to all administrative pro-
ceedings that otherwise meet the requirements of Younger.
The Dayton court did not abolish the requirement that the state
proceeding, administrative or judicial, must implicate some impor-
tant state interest. The Court carefully noted that "the elimination
of prohibited sex discrimination is a sufficiently important state in-
terest." 13 7 Again, the "important state interest" requirement per-
sists, 13a but its parameters remain uncertain.
C. The Requirement That the State Forum Be Adequate to
Hear the Federal Claim
An essential premise of the Younger doctrine is that the state
court will provide the would-be federal plaintiff with an adequate
forum in which to raise her constitutional claim and have it heard by
the state court. This promise is twofold: the state must provide the
party with both the procedures to raise her claim and a competent
tribunal to decide the claim fairly. The latter point remains an arti-
cle of faith for a majority of the Court. 3 9
The Gibson Court found abstention improper because the state
board was too prejudiced to consider competently the federal
134 Id. at 433-34.
135 Dayton, 106 S. Ct. at 2723.
136 Middesex, 457 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added). The Court analyzed the case by
asking three questions: 'first, do state bar disciplinary hearings within the constitution-
ally prescribed jurisdiction of the State Supreme Court constitute an ongoing state judi-
cial proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate important state interests; and third,
is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional chal-
lenges." Id.
137 Dayton, 106 S. Ct. at 2723.
138 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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claim.140 Thus, risk of agency capture or prejudice can taint the
board so that the federal court cannot rely on the state board to
vindicate the constitutional right thus making Younger abstention
inappropriate.
In Middlesex the Court characterized the state proceedings as ju-
dicial, but when it addressed the issue of the forum's adequacy, the
Court was uncertain that the plaintiff could raise his constitutional
defense.1 41 The Court found, however, that subsequent judicial re-
view of the disciplinary hearings sufficed. 142 The added delay to the
individual, who would have to wait until the state court reviewed his
constitutional claim, did not outweigh Our Federalism's interest in
permitting the state to act unhampered. Middlesex handles the ade-
quate forum requirement by making Younger abstention inappro-
priate if the state administrative proceeding cannot hear
the constitutional claim and no subsequent judicial review is
available. 143
Thus, the availability of some state judicial review that will fairly
hear and decide the constitutional claim satisfies the adequacy re-
quirement. The requirement poses no bar, then, if the would-be
federal plaintiff is in a state administrative proceeding subject to ju-
dicial review.
IV
YOUNGER IN THE FUTURE: THOUGHTS ABOUT AREAS FOR
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
The preceding discussion suggests that Our Federalism is far
more than the mere slogan or shibboleth that its detractors as-
sert.I44 Although Justice Black's language in Younger may indeed
sound like a "1940's radio serial,"' 45 Our Federalism has resonated
throughout many decisions over the years, and has emerged as a
powerful doctrine defining the relationship between federal courts
140 Gibson, 411 U.S. at 578-79.
141 Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435-36.
142 Id. at 436.
143 Dayton casts some doubt on the Middlesex rule. The Dayton Court concluded that
the state agency could hear the constitutional claim. Moreover, subsequent judicial re-
view was available making the state forum adequate under Middlesex. Yet, Justice Rehn-
quist went on to note in dictum that "even if Ohio law is such that the Commission may
not consider the constitutionality of the statute under which it operates, it would seem
an unusual doctrine... to say that the Commission could not construe its own statutory
mandate in the light of federal constitutional principles." Dayton, 106 S. Ct. at 2724.
Because all state officials, as well as judges, must follow the Constitution, executive of-
ficers, such as members of an administrative agency, will protect federally secured rights.
144 See supra note 6.
145 Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 463, 464 (1978).
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and the states. Yet even now open questions as to the scope of
Younger exist. This Note examines two such open questions and
suggests how the Court should answer them in light of Our
Federalism.
A. Younger Abstention and "Nonjudicial" Proceedings
Although Dayton clings to Middlesex's "judicial in nature" lan-
guage, Dayton's analysis differs so markedly that the language is in-
apposite. Middlesex characterized the proceeding as judicial,
allowing it to fall within the very terms of Younger. Dayton, on the
other hand, suggests that administrative proceedings as such trigger
Younger. Dayton examines the abstention question from the matrix of
Our Federalism's mandate that federal courts not "unduly interfere
with the legitimate activities of the States" 146 as opposed to a nar-
rower focus on the legitimate judicial activities of the states.
The Court laid the groundwork for abandoning this "quasi-ju-
dicial" requirement in Rizzo v. Goode.147 The district court in Rizzo
found sixteen instances of racially motivated police misconduct, and
"evidence of departmental procedure [that] indicated a tendency to
discourage the filing of civilian complaints."' 148 The court issued a
broad injunction requiring the police department to adopt civilian
complaint procedures.' 49 Using principles of Our Federalism, the
Supreme Court later reversed the district court, ruling that the dis-
trict court's order intruded too far into the state's activities. 150
Although Rizzo does not expressly cite Younger, the Court relied
on the language and the principles of Our Federalism to hold that a
federal court should not "inject[] itself by injunctive decree into the
internal .. .affairs of [a] state agency."' 151 The Court, alluding to
the Younger line of cases, noted that
the principles of federalism which play such an important part in
governing the relationship between federal courts and state gov-
ernments... [have] applicability where injunctive relief is sought,
not against the judicial branch of the state government, but
against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of
state or local governments. 152
Rizzo signalled a willingness to break from the "quasi-judicial"
146 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
147 423 U.S. 362 (1976); see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (re-
jecting injunction that would be "an ongoing federal audit" of state criminal system).
148 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 368.
149 Id. at 369-70.
150 Id at 377-80. The Court also found that the plaintiff's standing to sue was
doubtful. Id. at 372.
151 Id at 380.
152 Id.
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shackles of Younger and to ask only if federal injunctive relief will
unduly interfere with state activities.
Thus, the Younger doctrine does not require abstention only
when judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings are involved. By adher-
ing to that formulation, however, the Court injects uncertainty into
Younger's application. 153 Moreover, because the Court finds that
subsequent judicial review satisfied under the Younger doctrine, 154
the "judicial in nature" requirement becomes irrelevant for adjudi-
cating the constitutional claim.
B. Claims for Money Damages
All of the preceding discussion of Younger and its progeny has
been in the context of claims for federal injunctive relief. The Court
has not yet decided whether Younger also applies to claims for money
damages 155 and the circuits have split on the issue. 156 The princi-
ples of Our Federalism suggest that Younger should apply to claims
for damages.
In Deakins v. Monaghan 15 7 the Court affirmed a Third Circuit
decision that had required a district court to stay rather than dismiss
claims that the state proceeding could not adjudicate-in this case
claims for damages and attorney's fees arising from an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure. 158 The Deakins plaintiffs had originally
sought both injunctive and monetary relief, but the request for in-
junctive relief was moot by the time the Supreme Court heard the
153 If the Court abandoned the "judicial in nature" requirement it could unite
Younger abstention with Burford abstention, and clarify that area of the law as well. See
supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. The Burford Court carefully noted that Texas
had a system forjudidal review in place, and that the Supreme Court could review prop-
erly reserved federal questions. Burford, 319 U.S. at 334. In this respect, Burford is no
different from Middlesex and Dayton. After Dayton, the Younger doctrine applies to every
situation where Burford abstention is appropriate. Courts, therefore, no longer need a
separate Burford abstention.
154 See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
155 Deakins v. Monaghan, 108 S. Ct. 523, 529 n.6 (1988).
156 Five circuits have concluded that claims for money damages can trigger Younger.
Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986); Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405,
1406 (11th Cir. 1985); Parkhurst v. Wyoming, 641 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1981); Lan-
drigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 743 (1st Cir. 1980); McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d
795, 799 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Two circuits have
ruled that Younger does not apply to claims for money damages. Thomas v. Texas State
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 807 F.2d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1987); Carras v. Williams, 807
F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (6th Cir. 1986). In the face of this confusion, some circuits have
tried to stake out a middle ground. See Suggs v. Brannon, 804 F.2d 274, 279 (4th Cir.
1986); Crane v. Fauver, 762 F.2d 325 (3rd Cir. 1985); Giulini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d 189,
193 (2d Cir. 1981).
157 108 S. Ct. 523 (1988), af'g in part and vacating in part 798 F.2d 632 (3rd Cir.
1986).
158 Id. at 530-31.
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case. 159 The question still remained, however, of the propriety of
the district court's dismissal of the claim for damages and attorney's
fees when, as in most criminal proceedings, the state court could not
hear those claims.1 60
The Deakins Court, relying upon the representations of plain-
tiffs' counsel that plaintiffs would seek a stay of the claims for dam-
ages pending a resolution of the state proceedings, found it
unnecessary to decide the extent to which Younger applies to claims
solely for money damages. 16 1 However, the Court did not fully ex-
plain why a stay was appropriate. Indeed, the Court stressed the
" 'virtually unflagging obligation' " of federal courts to exercise
their jurisdiction. 162 As Justice White noted in his concurring opin-
ion, joined by Justice O'Connor, "Why, then, stay the § 1983 dam-
ages claim asserting a violation of federal constitutional rights?
Why does not the District Court's 'unflagging obligation' require it
to proceed on that claim?"' 163
The Court could fashion a prudential rule calling for federal
courts to stay actions when faced with parallel state proceedings, but
it has never done so. 164 Younger abstention and the principles of
Our Federalism, however, provide a simple justification for the
Court's decision in Deakins. Moreover, applying Younger to claims
for damages would be entirely consistent with the Court's decisions
under Younger.
As Justice White noted in his concurring opinion in which he
urged that the Court reach the question of Younger's applicability, if
a federal court adjudicates a claim for money damages, the potential
for interference with the state court proceeding is just as great as
when it adjudicates claims for injunctive relief.165 A federal court
159 Id. at 528-29. The Deakins plaintiffs were the subject of a state grand jury investi-
gation when they first brought their action in the federal court seeking injunctive and
monetary relief under section 1983. The federal plaintiffs did not fall within the current
scope of Younger with respect to their request for injunctive relief because the Court has
yet to decide whether Younger applies to state grand jury proceedings, one of the issues
on which the Court granted certiorari. Id. at 525. By the time of oral argument, how-
ever, the grand jury had returned indictments against three of the federal court plaintiffs
and the illegally seized evidence was returned. Id. at 527. The Court, relying in part on
the representations of the plaintiffs' counsel that plaintiffs wished to withdraw their fed-
eral claims for equitable relief, found that issue moot. Id. at 528-29.
160 Id. at 529.
161 Id. at 529 & n.6.
162 Id. at 530 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)); see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
163 Id. at 532 (White, J., concurring).
164 Id. The Third Circuit's rule, which the Deakins majority endorsed, id. at 530 (ma-
jority opinion), does seem to have its origins in prudential concerns, rather than Younger
per se. See Crane v. Fauver, 762 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1985); Williams v. Red Bank Bd. of
Educ., 662 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1981).
165 Deakins, 108 S. Ct. at 533 (White, J., concurring) ("Why the latter action [for
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determination of the damages claim would decide many questions
that may be at issue in the state proceeding, and these determina-
tions would have res judicata effect. 1 66 This result would not differ
from that of an adjudication of claims for injunctive relief or declar-
atory relief, both of which fall within Younger. The federal court
should stay its hand because any other course would interfere with
the state action.
One twist that claims for monetary relief present is that the fed-
eral plaintiff may not be able to obtain such relief from the state
proceeding. As Deakins itself showed, damages and attorney's fees
may not be available in the state criminal proceeding. Thus it is
proper for a district court to stay the claims for damages rather than
dismiss them outright; the stay would protect the plaintiff from the
running of the statute of limitations. 167 In addition, federal plain-
tiffs would be unable to make an end-run around Younger by making
their claims for monetary relief rather than for injunctive relief.
Thus, where Younger contemplates outright dismissal of claims
for injunctive relief,168 Our Federalism calls for the staying of ac-
tions for monetary relief. In this way the federal court will vindicate
the federal right, but will do so without "unduly interfer[ing] with
the legitimate activities of the States."' 169 The federal plaintiff will
suffer some delay, but that delay will further Our Federalism's goal
of permitting the states to act without undue interference.
V
CONCLUSION
In some ways it is appropriate that a judge-made doctrine such
as Younger defines the relationship between the federal courts and
the states. Tension and controversy will always remain a part of the
Younger doctrine because visions of federalism will always differ.
This Note suggests that there is substance to Our Federalism, not
mere sloganeering, and that Younger's development has been, and
can continue to be, coherent. Federal courts cannot and should not
abandon their role as vindicators of federal rights and interests.
Nevertheless, the hope of Our Federalism remains that if the federal
courts pursue their role without unduly interfering with the activi-
damages] should be considered lss problematic for purposes of comity or 'Our Federal-
ism' escapes me. If anything, I would have thought just the opposite would be true.").
166 Id.
167 Id. at 531 (majority opinion).
168 Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) ("Younger v. Harris contemplates
the outright dismissal of the federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state
and federal, to the statements.").
169 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
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ties of the states, our federal system can achieve its greatest poten-
tial.
David Mason
